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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(3). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant/plaintiff charo/H ^ppwil»r'uvi"ii<Jdni WHIM IXH. 
Upon a motion to suppress appellant's evidence, the Honorable Joseph 
I. Dimick, Fourth Circuit Judge of the Provo Circuit, granted appellee's 
motion to suppress and entered an Order to that effect on March 1, 
1990. 
This appeal is from the Order to suppress Appellant's evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether under Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44.10(6) a defendant 
must be given a "roasonabln upporlumlv" ID uhlani .-in independent test. 
II. Whether Appellee was given a reasonable opportunity to 
effectively exercise her right to an independent test in addition l< > I ho lest 
or tests administered by the polia? ,is permitted hy I N.ili Code Ann. §41-
6-44.10(6). 
III. Whether Appellee failed to obtain an additional test? 
IV. Whether Appellef additional test? 
V. Whether the proper remedy when a defendant is not given 
reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to an independent test is 
suppression of the police evidence. 
l 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44.10 (Set forth in its entirety in the 
Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 14, the defendant, Mary Werner, was arrested by 
Provo City Police for driving under the influence. (R. at 1). Upon being 
asked to submit to a breath test, she initially declined and requested a 
separate and independent urine test. The police officers then 
admonished her concerning Utah's Implied Consent Law. 
Consequently, Mrs. Werner submitted to the Intoxilyzer test. (T. at 46). 
Defendant then renewed her request for an independent test. The 
police then responded by giving her a vial within which to secure her own 
test. (Id.) Defendant then went into the restroom, unattended and 
unwitnessed, and secured her own sample. (T. at 47). Defendant was 
also given other materials with which to stop the vial. (R. at 105). After 
being released, defendant took her urine sample to Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center for testing. The hospital refused to test the sample for 
the reasons that they did not find it sealed and they were unsure of it's 
chain of custody. (Id.) 
On December 18,1989, defendant, Mary Sue Werner, made a 
motion to suppress the evidence of the Intoxilyzer breath test. (R. at 12). 
At trial, counsel stipulated to the above facts. It was also noted that the 
arresting officer was aware of evidence gathering procedures regarding 
the gathering of evidence, including urine tests, and recited the 
procedures to the Court. (T. at 32). 
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Upon ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the judge found 
that defendant was read and made aware of her right to an independent 
test. (R. at 105). The judge also t i n icludod lhal. defendant was given 
materials within which to secure her sample, and later given more 
materials with which to seal her sample. Consequently, the judge held 
that the above police involvement was equivalent to them giving 
assistance and advice to defendant to securing her own independent 
test. (R. at 107). The court also found that the sample clearly could not 
have been admitted into evidenn» ' ' l I1 "> ' M| "i'elusion of the 
Court was that the police did not provide a reasonable opportunity to the 
defendant to effectively exercise her right to an independent test, and 
that such conduct ',!"1 n'l t" <l«u'v ' I ' " (Intend; i"i Hi m process of law. (Id.) 
The City appeals from that decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee was not given a reasonable opportunity to gather her own 
evidence due to the advice and assistance rendered by the police. The 
plain meaning of Utah Code Ann «j n h 44 11 in ,i does not require the 
police to assist one suspected of an alcohol related driving offense in 
obtaining an independent blood alcohol test. However, when tho police, 
by their own choice, undertake lo a'Mst ancle H qwv. advice to a 
defendant regarding ways to secure her own evidence or tests, the 
police become responsible for the assistance and/or advice they qivo. 
Otherwise, if the trial Court's decision is overtmnnl it would be likely that 
in the future the police could frustrate the attempts of defendants to 
secure their own tests by giving advice and assistance which would 
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render any independent tests inadmissible, which would ultimately make 
U.C.A. §41-6-44.10(6) meaningless. 
Appellee did not fail to obtain a test nor was she unable to obtain a 
test. But rather, appellee was not given a reasonable opportunity to 
secure an admissible test by a doctor of her own choice because of the 
advice and assistance of the police. Therefore, the correct remedy is 
suppression of the police evidence. 
The trial court's decision to suppress the evidence would not place 
an inordinate burden on the police but rather continue to make them 
responsible for their actions. The decision would actually have the effect 
of relieving officers of the duty to assist suspects in gathering their own 
evidence. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant alleges that the Trial Court's ruling suppressing evidence 
contradicts public policy, places an inordinate burden on the police and 
is in direct contravention of both statute and law. However, appellee 
believes that the Trial Court's ruling suppressing police evidence, will not 
place an inordinate burden on the police in gathering their own evidence 
and will not burden the police to gather exculpatory evidence for a 
defendant. Police efficiency would not be compromised and no 
message contradicting legislative intent would be given to those involved 
in alcohol related activities or to the public in general. 
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A. APPELLEE WAS NOT GIVEN A REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE HER OWN EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS A DENIAL OF 
HER DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(6)(a) and (b) state in relevant part 
that "The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician 
of his own choice administer a chemical test" and that the "failure or 
inability to obtain the additional test does not affect the admissibility of 
the results of the test" taken by the police. It is clear from the statute that 
appellee had the right to obtain an independent test. It is an 
uncontroverted fact that appellee requested an independent test before 
and after she submitted to the breath test administered by the police. It 
is also reasonable to assume from the language of the statute that 
appellee should be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain an 
independent test. Otherwise, if a defendant is not given a reasonable 
opportunity to secure her own test, the statute is meaningless and due 
process is sacrificed. 
Those suspected of driving while intoxicated in many other 
jurisdictions have not only a codified and/or judicially interpreted right to 
obtain an independent test but also the right to have a "reasonable 
opportunity" to do so.*1 However, U.C.A. §41 -6-44.10 does not explicitly 
state that a defendant must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain 
an independent test and the Utah Courts have been silent on the issue. 
Therefore, whether or not a defendant should be given a "reasonable 
opportunity" to obtain an independent test is a primary issue in this 
1See: People v. Underwood. 396 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. App. 1986); Fairfax v. Smith. 330 S.E.2d 290 
(S.C 1985); State v. Hilditch. 584 P.2d 376 (Or. App. 1978); State v. Dressier. 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 
App. 1988); Bilbrev v. State. 531 So.2d 27 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987), State v. Reed. 36 Wash. App. 193, 
672 P.2d 1277 (Wash. App. 1983). 
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appeal. Appellee believes it only reasonable and in line with current 
rulings of other states with similar statutes that U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 be 
interpreted to give a defendant a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain an 
independent test. 
Whether a defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to obtain 
an independent test is dependant on the facts of each individual case. 
See. Bilbrey v. State. 531 So.2d 27, 30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v. 
Dressier. 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. App. 1988); Blaine v. Suess. 93 Wash. 
2d 722, 612 P.2d 789 (Wash. 1980). The facts in this case are that 
Appellee clearly requested an independent test before and after the 
police administered the breathalyzer test. Appellee was given advice as 
to how to secure her own sample and she was provided a vial in which to 
secure a urine sample. She was told where the bathroom was and while 
unattended secured her own sample. The police then gave her other 
material with which to stop the vial. Appellee believes that since the 
police took affirmative action by giving her advice, materials and 
assistance regarding the manner in which to secure her own 
independent test that the police (as opposed to the hospital, doctors or 
any one else) interfered with the test, at least to an extent causing 
appellee to not have a reasonable opportunity to have an independent 
test performed. 
Appellant argues that the level of police interference must be 
"substantial" or "unreasonable interference" for the court to suppress 
police evidence. Appellant also refers to such words as "egregious" and 
"overt" to describe the type of police interference necessary to suppress 
evidence. Appellee believes that the above terms relating to police 
interference are not synonymous and that the level of police interference 
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certainly does not have to rise to the level of being "egregious" for a 
defendant to prevail on a suppression motion. However, appellee 
believes that the interference which occurred in this case was certainly 
"substantial" and "unreasonable." 
In State v. Clark. 762 P.2d 853, 855 (Mont. 1988) as cited by 
appellant, the Court held that "[o]ur decisions do not mandate police 
officers to affirmatively act to obtain exculpatory evidence, but instead, to 
avoid interference with efforts on the part of the accused to obtain a 
sampling of his blood." (Emphasis added.) See also. Commonwealth v. 
Alano. 388 Mass. 871,448 N.E.2d 1122,1128 (Mass. 1983); Dressier at 
551. To uphold the circuit court's ruling would not mandate police to 
affirmatively act in behalf of a defendant. In State v. Hilditch. 584 P.2d 
376, 377 (Or.App. 1978) the Court stated that the police were not 
required to affirmatively act to assist the defendant secure his own 
exculpatory evidence. However, the court went on to imply that once the 
police have undertaken to assist the defendant, the police become 
responsible for the assistance that they give.2 
The police should be responsible for the assistance they give. 
After all, the police have guidelines to follow and have been trained in 
gathering evidence. As stated at trial, the arresting officer had expertise 
in gathering evidence and knew the correct procedure to obtain a valid 
urine sample. He knew or should have known that the procedure he 
proscribed for appellee to acquire her own evidence would guarantee 
the inadmissability of the evidence. 
2See Also. Annot., 45 A.LFUth 11 (1986). 
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B. APPELLEE DID NOT FAIL TO OBTAIN AN ADDITIONAL 
TEST NOR WAS SHE UNABLE TO DO SO. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44.10 (6) clearly gives an accused the right 
to have an additional test or tests administered at his or her own 
expense. However, U.C.A. §41 -6-44.10 (6)(b) states that "the failure or 
inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or 
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace 
officer." (Emphasis added.) Appellant relies heavily on this section of the 
code. However, appellee neither failed, nor was she unable to obtain an 
additional test. 
The Court of Appeals in Oregon stated that "Thus, we think the 
term 'failure' to obtain a blood test must refer to a situation where an 
arrestee makes no effort or request to obtain a test." Hilditch. at 377. 
See also. Dressier, at 552. According to the language of Hilditch and 
Dressier appellee did not fail to obtain an independent test. The 
stipulated facts in this case are that plaintiff made numerous requests for 
an additional urine test both before the police conducted the Intoxilyzer 
test and after the completion of the Intoxilyzer test. Appellant seems to 
suggest that appellee failed to obtain an additional test due to her "lack of 
diligence," "carelessness," and "failing to protect her interest." Appellee 
clearly did not lack diligence in her efforts to secure an independent test. 
As stated, she requested the independent test both before and after the 
police administered Intoxilyzer tests. Also, having received materials 
and instructions from the police on the manner in which to secure her 
own urine sample, she proceeded to carry out the instructions given to 
her. After her release, appellee went to the hospital to have her sample 
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tested by a competent physician. The hospital declined to test the 
sample for various reasons, some of which being that the vial was not 
properly sealed or marked. Appellee believes that all of the facts above 
clearly show that she did not lack diligence, she was not careless, and 
she did not fail to protect her interest in her attempt to obtain an 
independent test. Therefore, according to Hilditch and Dressier, 
appellee did not fail to obtain an additional test. 
"•[liability' to obtain a test refers to the situation where, for some 
reason independent of the conduct of either the arrestee or the police, 
such as loss of the blood sample by the hospital performing the test, an 
independent chemical analysis cannot be obtained." Hilditch. Id. Again, 
according to the language of Hilditch and Dressier, plaintiff was not 
unable to obtain an independent test. Appellant erroneously states that 
the police did not interfere, but rather the hospital caused the 
interference that is claimed by appellee. Under the rules of evidence 
appellee's urine sample was clearly inadmissible before the sample ever 
reached the hospital. The hospital, therefore, correctly refused the 
responsibility of testing the sample. Appellant goes on to state that "Mrs. 
Werner was free to consult with any of the several hospitals in the 
immediate area in order to have her urine sample tested." See Brief of 
the Appellant, p. 15. This statement again seems to suggest that the 
blame should be put on the hospital for not testing the urine sample, or 
that the blame rests with appellee due to her failure to check with other 
hospitals to have the sample tested. However, the Court found that the 
urine sample could never have been admitted into evidence even if it 
had been tested. Again, due to police interference well before appellee 
was released from custody, the urine sample was clearly inadmissible 
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according to the rules of evidence. Third party interference becomes 
irrelevant due to the interference occurring well before any third party 
was ever involved. 
Appellant also suggests that according to the language in State v. 
Goodwin. 160 Ariz. 366, 773 P.2d 471 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) that appellee 
acted unilaterally in her attempt to secure an independent test and that 
the police interference was not unreasonable. However, the facts in 
Goodwin are clearly different from the facts in the case at hand. In 
Goodwin, the police, having administered at least two breathalyzer tests, 
gave defendant one of the breathalyzer ampoules. It was explained to 
the defendant that the sample was for his own benefit. However, the 
defendant stated that he had no desire to keep the sample. The police 
then responded that if he wanted to throw it away he was free to do so. 
The police did not throw the ampoule away, the defendant threw it away. 
The Court held that the defendant, due to his own actions, waived his 
right to the second test. The defendant clearly knew that he had the 
right to the second sample, and had possession of his own potentially 
valid evidence; yet, by his own actions, waived his right by discarding the 
sample given him by the police. Simply stated, the defendant didn't want 
the sample, threw it away and, therefore, waived his right to it. This is 
clearly different from the facts in the case at hand. Appellee requested 
the right to have a second sample taken and tested and the police 
assisted in acquiring the urine sample. Contrary to appellant's view, 
appellee did not act unilaterally in asking for and acquiring an 
independent test, but rather, was assisted by the police in acquiring that 
test. There was clearly no interference by any third party which would 
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have rendered appellee unable to obtain an independent test. The only 
interference involved in this case was that of the police officers by giving 
appellee instructions as to how to acquire her own independent test, by 
giving her the materials in which to secure her own test, and by later 
giving her yet more materials and instructions with which to stop the vial. 
The police and appellee entered into a bilateral relationship; the police, 
by giving assistance and materials, the appellee by relying on the 
instructions and materials given her by the police. Therefore, the actions 
of appellee were not unilateral. 
Because plaintiff clearly requested an independent test both 
before and after the police administered Intoxilyzer test, she did not fail 
to acquire a test as prescribed under Utah Code. There was also no 
third party interference which would preclude appellee from obtaining an 
independent test. The only interference in this case was that of the 
police officers. 
C. AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS APPELLEE'S RIGHT TO AN 
INDEPENDENT TEST IN ADDITION TO AND DIFFERENT 
FROM THE TEST TAKEN BY THE POLICE OFFICERS 
At issue in the cases cited under heading "C" of the Brief of the 
Appellant was the exculpatory nature of the evidence gathered by, or 
known to the police officers and whether the police had the duty to 
preserve such evidence for the defendant. The language and intent of 
Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44.10(6) is essentially the same as that of the 
Wash Rev. Code §46-61 -506(5) (1983) (effective January 1,1985). The 
u 
Washington Supreme Court stated that the intent of the above cited 
Washington statute was to afford a D.U.I suspect: 
the opportunity to obtain evidence with which to 
impeach the results of a single breathalyzer test, if 
such evidence exists. The suspect also takes the risk 
that the second test will verify and substantiate the 
result of the first. The statute strikes an appropriate 
balance between 
the rights of the accused to gather evidence in his own 
defense and the need to avoid undue burdens upon 
the State. The accused is given the right to choose the 
type of additional chemical test to be administered and 
the person to perform the test, so long as that person is 
available, willing and "qualified" to do so by being on the 
statutory list. 
State v. Stannard. 109 Wash.2d 29, 742 P.2d 1244 at 1247 (Wash. 1987) 
(emphasis added). The issue is not whether appellee has the right to 
police gathered evidence or evidence known to the police to exist as is 
the case in the majority of the cases cited by appellant which refer to 
evidence that an accused wanted that was acquired by the police and 
then destroyed by the police.3 
Trying to obtain exculpatory evidence from the evidence that the 
police had gathered and then destroyed or obtaining the evidence that 
was known to the police is not equivalent with police interfering with the 
right of a defendant to secure her own independent evidence. 
Furthermore, the evidence in the cases cited by appellant had been 
tested, and therefore, the exculpatory value of the evidence was known. 
In the case at hand, the evidence that appellee attempted to acquire was 
3Califomia v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 M984): United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Lavton 
Citv v. Watson. 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 1987); People v. Humes. 762 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1988); and 
Arizona v. Youngblood. U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988). 
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not tested, and the exculpatory value was not known. Therefore, it is 
possible that appellee's urine sample when tested may have been 
exculpatory. The evidence that Appellee attempted to obtain was 
material and not merely cumulative. It was an additional test and 
different from that of the police administered test. However, as stated 
above, the exculpatory value of the evidence is not the real issue in this 
case. The issue remains, was appellee given a reasonable opportunity 
to have an independent test? 
D. THE PROPER REMEDY IS SUPPRESSION OF THE POLICE 
EVIDENCE 
Appellee believes that the proper remedy in cases that involve 
police denying a defendant a reasonable opportunity to obtain an 
independent test is suppression of the police gathered evidence. See. 
State v. Burns. 364 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1988); State v. Hilditch. 36 Or. App. 
497, 584 P.2d 376 (Or. App. 1978); State v. Hughes. 181 Ga. App. 448, 
352 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. App. 1987); Fairfax v. Smith. 380 S.E.2d 290 (S.C. 
1985); Gordan v. State. 190 Ga. App. 55, 378 S.E. 2d 362 (Ga. App. 
1989) 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, appellee neither failed, nor was 
she unable to acquire an independent test, but rather, the police 
interfered with her right to acquire an independent test and 
the proper remedy is suppression of the Intoxilyzer test results. The 
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appellee respectfully requests that this court affirm the Trial Court's 
ruling. ~ f £ r ^ 
DATED this I ^ day of -September 
14 
ADDENDUM 
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II 6 44 ^ M0|O!t VKIIIUf 'S 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acta alleged to have 
been committed whilo I he person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug. 
Ilislorv: C. 1053, II 6-4 1.10. enacted by L. 
1981. ch. 120, $ 13; !,. 1983. ch. 09, ft 16; 
1087. ch. 129. ft 3; 1987, ch. 138, ft 11; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 113: 1987 (1st S.S.l. ch. 8, ft§ 3. 4; 
1988. ch. 118. § I; 1990, ch. 30. ft 21. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"specific chemical tost" for "specific test" in the 
second sentence in Subsection (lMc); deleted 
* «»r any one or all of the tests" after "chemical 
ANALYSIS 
tMounds for requesting test. 
Refusal to submit to test. 
Right to refuse test. 
Cited 
(•rounds for requesting test. 
This section does not require an arrest prior 
to taking a blood sample, and allows drawing 
blood (mm an unconscious person \\it\i or with-
out an arre<t Slate v. Wight. 76ft l\2d 12 
•I'lah t'l App 108S». 
Refusal to submit to test. 
h n s e r s conduct was refusal when, although 
be verbally agreed to tests, he obstructed the 
process by sticking his tongue over and chew-
ing on the mouthpiece and blowing out the 
I'tah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in I tab law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal i 
Law. 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177. c 
History: C. 1953. 11-6 11.11, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 49, ft I. 
Effective Dntes. — Laws 1990, ch 49 he-
test" in the first sentence in Subsection l2)(a»; 
I; designated the former third and fourth sen-
r
» tences in Subsection 12Ma* as present Subsec-
I; tion <2>tb»; designated the final two sentences 
in former Subsection <2MaMiiit as present Sub-
sections 12Mc» and (ch and redesignated former 
^ Subsections (2Mb) to <2Md) as present Subsec-
Q
 tions l2>(e> to (2Mg); and made stylistic 
' changes. 
sides of his mouth, thereby preventing officers 
from obtaining an adequate, viable breath 
sample. Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P 2d 280 
(Utah Ct. App 1989>. 
Right to refuse test. 
Hlood sample taken from a juvenile motorist 
who was not placed under arrest, who was not 
_ informed that he could refuse to submit to the 
!_ lest, and who did not consent thereto, was 
2 taken contrary to tlu- provisions of this section, 
ami the test results were therefore inadmissi-
ble In re I.. 771 I» 2d 1068 tl.Hnh 19891, vacat-
ing 739 |» 2d 1124 (Utah Ct. App 19871 (noted 
'• in bound volume under this catchlinc) 
Cited in Rurkett v. Schwendiman. 773 l\2d 
42 (Utah 19891 
A.L.IL — Sufficiency of showing of physical 
I inability to take tests for driving while intoxi-
ated to justify refusal, 68 A L R 4th 776 
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI. Sac. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-44.11. Alcohol and drug testing fee. 
(11 (n) In addition to any other fee, a $60 alcohol and drug testing fee shall 
be imposed on any person convicted of an offense under Section 41-641 or 
a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of Section 
41-6-43. 
(b> The fee shall he collected by the court issuing the conviction. 
<2> Fees collected under this section shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
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41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic heverage and open con-
tainers in motor vehicle prohibited — Definitions 
— Exceptions. 
( D A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor 
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is mov-
ing, stopped, or parked on any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to 
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains 
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the 
contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) in this section: 
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally 
occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to 
them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not 
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the 
vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehi-
cle. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters 
of a motor home or camper. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed 
taxicab or bus. 
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who have carried 
their own alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or chartered bus that is in 
compliance with Subsections 32A 12-213(1 Kb) and (c). 
History. C. 1953, 41 6-44.20, enacted by L. "Section 32A 1 105" for "Section 32A-1-5" at 
1981, ch. 272, 6 1; 1987, ch. 92, ft 55; 1987, the end of Subsection (3 ><a); added present Sub-
ch. 138, ft 12; 1990, ch. 23, ft 188. sections (3Kb) and (3)(c); redesignated former 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Subsection (3)(b) as Subsection (3)(d); and 
ment, effective February 21, 1990, substituted added Subsection (6). 
41-6-45. Reckless driving — Penalty. 
Cros9-Hcference9. — Jurisdiction of juve-
nile court, ft 78 3a 16. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Driver's license hearing. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
—Double jeopardy. 
Proof to sustain conviction. 
—Sufficient. 
Constitutionality. 
Subsection (1), which prohibits driving or 
controlling a vehicle with a specified blood-al-
cohol level, does not create a conclusive pre-
sumption, and is not, therefore, unconstitu-
tional, because the defendant is allowed to 
challenge the accuracy of the test on any rele-
vant ground. City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 
P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Driver ' s l icense hear ing . 
—Collateral estoppel. 
A city is not collaterally estopped from pro-
ceeding with a criminal action for driving un-
der the influence because of the decision at the 
driver's license hearing not to suspend the de-
fendant's driver's license, since at the driver's 
license hearing, the governmental entity in-
volved is an agency of the state, not the city. 
City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
—Double jeopardy. 
As a driver's license hearing is clearly civil, 
double jeopardy did not require trial court to 
dismiss driving under the influence charges. 
City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Proof to sustain conviction. 
—Sufficient. 
The trial court had sufficient evidence before 
it upon which it could find that the defendant's 
blood-alcohol content at the time of the viola-
tion was .08% or higher, where the test, con-
ducted a short period of time after the arrest, 
showed a result of .09%. There was credible 
evidence that supported a finding that the con-
sumption of beer immediately before the arrest 
made no appreciable difference in the test re-
sults, and there was nothing in the record that 
suggested that the defendant had anything 
other than a normal conversion ratio. City of 
Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: 
use in impaired driving prosecution, 60 
A.LR.4th 1129. 
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by 
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's 
negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16. 
Passenger's liability to vehicular accident 
victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor 
vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R.4th 272. 
Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evils" 
defense that driving was necessary to protect 
life or property, 64 A.L.R.4th 298. 
Cough medicine as "intoxicating liquor" un-
der DUI statute, 65 AL.R.4th 1238. 
Horseback riding or operation of horse-
drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute, 
71 A.LR.4th 1129. 
Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving 
statute, 73 A.L R.4th 1139. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis Evi-
dence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Rebuttable presumption. 
Tests admissible. 
Constitutionality. 
Section 41-6-44(1), which prohibits driving 
or controlling a vehicle with a specified blood-
alcohol level, does not create a conclusive pre-
sumption, and is not, therefore, unconstitu-
tional, because the defendant is allowed to 
challenge the accuracy of the test on any rele-
vant ground. City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 
P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Rebuttable presumption. 
State created a rebuttable presumption that 
a breath testing machine was accurate by in-
troducing into evidence an affidavit showing 
that two qualified technicians had tested the 
machine four days before defendant's arrest 
and had found it to be functioning properly. 
Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P 2d 87 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
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Fact that intoxilyzer machine malfunctioned working properly four days before defendant's 
after test was administered was not sufficient breath test even though no evidence had been 
to show that defendant was prejudiced, where presented showing that the machine had been 
defendant offered no independent evidence to calibrated and tested both immediately before 
show how the malfunction affected her test re- and immediately after his breath test, since 
suits so that the presumption of the validity of this procedure, known as "bookending," is not 
the test was not rebutted. State v. Vigil, 722
 o n l y r edundant and expensive but, under the 
P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). procedures mandated by the legislature and 
Tests admissible . carried out by the department, is unnecessary. 
There was sufficient evidence to admit intox- Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P.2d 87 (Utah 
iiyzer test results where the machine had been Ct. App. 1988). 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may 
prosecute for certain DUI offenses and driving 
while license suspended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of 
cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to 
prosecute these alleged violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Subsection 
41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) or a local ordinance similar to Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) 
that complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43; and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person 
operating a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked 
for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with 
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, 
or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a 
result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged with violat-
ing one of or more of those sections or ordinances. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L. ductory paragraph and Subsection <1); desig-
1983, ch. 102, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 40; 1990, nated the former section as Subsection (2); and 
ch. 299, § 2. made a related stylistic change in present Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- section (2). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the intro-
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
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alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other 
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine may not select the test 
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, 
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test 
requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the 
test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. Following 
this warning, unless the person immediately requests that the chemical 
test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be 
given. 
(b) A peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the division, 
immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privi-
lege or license to operate a motor vehicle When the officer serves the 
immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by 
the division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after 
the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to 
submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the 
arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division shall 
notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If 
the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before 
the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall be 
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revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the date 
of arrest. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(14), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper. 
(g) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or crimi-
nal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
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